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Sequencing, Acoustic Separation, and 3-D Negotiation of
Complex Barriers: Charlene Barshefsky and IP Rights in China
REBECCA HULSE* & JAMES K. SEBENIUS t
'Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, 28 State Street, Boston, MA 02109, USA; 2Harvard Business
School, Soldier's Field, Boston, MA 02163, USA (E-mail: jsebenius@hbs.edu)
Abstract. Taking the perspective of the lead U.S. negotiator, Charlene Barshefsky, this article
details and analyzes the negotiations that took place in the mid-1990s between the United
States and the People's Republic of China over intellectual property rights (IPR). Employing
a "negotiation analytic" methodology, Charlene Barshefsky's actions are interpreted to suggest
a number of promising approaches to managing the daunting complexities of trade and other
negotiations: recognizing the multiparty aspects of apparently bilateral dealings and capturing
them in a "deal diagram;" carefully assessing "barriers" to agreement; sequencing to build
a winning coalition and overcome potentially blocking ones; "acoustic separation" of issue-
frames; and, most broadly, changing the game advantageously relative to a purely tactical
orientation "at the table" through 3-D actions "away from the table."
Keywords: cross-cultural negotiation, intellectual property, international negotiation,
negotiation analysis, trade, U.S.-Chinese negotiation
International trade negotiations pose notorious complexities, especially in
their multilateral form.1 Even in nominally bilateral trade talks, however,
barriers to agreement can be dauntingly complex, involving multiple parties,
levels, and tactical choices. This article analyzes one such set of negotiations
that took place in the mid-1990s between the United States and the People's
Republic of China over intellectual property rights (IPR).2 Presented mainly
from the viewpoint of a key protagonist, then-Deputy United States Trade
Representative (USTR) Charlene Barshefsky, and drawing primarily on U.S.
sources, this account helps to explain how an agreement was reached that
many influential parties opposed at the time and that informed observers
judged quite unlikely.
* Rebecca Hulse served as Deputy Director for China and Hong Kong from 1996-1998
during Ambassador Barshefsky's tenure as U.S. Trade Representative. Hulse is currently a
lawyer in Boston specializing in intellectual property and corporate law.
t James K. Sebenius is the Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration at
Harvard Business School, Director of the Negotiation Roundtable, and formerly on the faculty
of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Author of many scholarly and popular articles,
he has also written books on negotiation including Negotiating the Law of the Sea (Harvard
University Press) and The Manager as Negotiator (Free Press, with David Lax).
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This case may be of interest to those focused on the dynamics of the
"new" trade agenda of intellectual property and services rather than more
traditional tariffs and non-tariff obstacles to free trade. Yet beyond these
policy issues is a close reading of the kinds of complex barriers facing
those who seek agreements in international negotiations and the complex
strategies and tactics adopted by negotiators to surmount them. Insights from
this analysis can inform both explanatory and prescriptive theories, espe-
cially the emerging methodology of "negotiation analysis." 3 In particular,
Barshefsky's strategy incorporated several distinctive elements: a series of
disaggregated, sequential actions "away from the table" to build a winning
coalition and overcome potentially blocking ones; efforts to "acoustically
separate" different messages for different parties at different levels; and steps
to make sanctions threats credible, to change the game and to shape Chinese
incentives for agreement, rather than more frequently studied tactical moves
"at the table" to play the "game as given." As such, this case offers an illus-
tration of the 3-D approach of Lax and Sebenius in which the first dimension
is interpersonal process, the second substance, and the third the scope of the
game itself, whether fixed or variable.4
The analysis will proceed in three steps: (1) a description of the context
and an assessment of the major barriers facing Barshefsky and others who
favored an agreement backed by the threat of sanctions; (2) an account
of the overall strategy and highly differentiated, sequential tactics used by
Barshefsky for a tailored approach to each set of parties and associated
barriers; and (3) an assessment and some possible generalizations from this
extended episode.
Context and Major Barriers
In 1993, piracy of U.S. intellectual property in China raged. Chinese pirates
counterfeited Madonna and Michael Jackson CDs by the millions, bootleg
copies of new U.S. software launched on Chinese PCs across the country,
and popular movies like Jurassic Park appeared as DVDs in the back alleys of
Shanghai long before their release in theaters in the United States.5 Growth
in China's economy coupled with increasingly sophisticated counterfeiting
techniques fueled piracy on a scale never before witnessed, especially in
the southern province of Guangdong, widely regarded as the most capitalist-
oriented and free-wheeling Chinese province. To demonstrate the urgency of
the piracy problem (encompassing piracy of copyrighted works - including
computer software, audiovisual works and published works - and of trade-
marks), U.S. officials highlighted the existence of 29 factories in southern
China that churned out an estimated 75 million illegal CDs and laser disks
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(LDs) per year. Because the Chinese domestic market for CDs amounted to
only 5 million disks, the U.S. further contended that Chinese pirated CDs
were being exported on a massive scale, threatening markets from Hong
Kong to Canada. 6 As Bonnie Richardson of the Motion Picture Association
observed, "the IPR problem became massive not because of the domestic
Chinese market; the piracy problem reached the pinnacle it did because China
had become the world's largest exporter of pirated materials. This is what
raised attention levels."7
Industry associations and executives, especially from the sound and movie
recording sectors, had lobbied hard for this "blatant abuse" to be stopped. Yet
all previous attempts by USTR to address the problem had fallen short. Too
many interests within and outside of Washington aligned against - or were
ambivalent about - meaningful action on China IPR.
One of Charlene Barshefsky's first assignments as Deputy United States
Trade Representative was to "do something" about a new intellectual property
rights agreement with the Chinese. In her judgment, real results would require
a multi-pronged approach, underpinned by a threat to initiate Section 301
sanctions - a form of unilateral action permitted under U.S. trade law to
address unfair trading practices abroad.
Yet, many observers assumed that, at best, she would deliver just what her
predecessors had: a promising deal on paper that did little if anything to actu-
ally stop actual counterfeiting of American products. Such skepticism about
reaching a meaningful agreement, especially one backed by sanctions, was
grounded in an appreciation for a series of the daunting barriers that hindered
results: active Chinese opposition along with passive opposition by many of
its non-U.S. trading partners; deep hesitancy by the White House following
its recent and spectacularly unsuccessful effort to sanction China over human
rights practices; an influential segment of the U.S. business community urging
forebearance, given its major Chinese investments that risked retaliation; as
well as several groups - environmental, labor, human rights, and national
security - that opposed "squandering" the potent U.S. leverage of sanctions
on "CDs and videos" rather than husbanding that leverage for possible use on
their preferred issues.
Barrier #1: Adamant Chinese opposition. The most obvious foe of IPR pro-
tection reform in China was the Chinese government itself. The Chinese
keenly opposed USTR's persistent calls for change in its IPR regime, and
even more, the idea of following through on any form of U.S. demand. The
Chinese had grudgingly signed IPR agreements in the past, but for the most
part had yet to follow their dictates. Several bungled U.S. sanctions attempts,
China's awareness of the allure to U.S. businesses of the 1.2 billion-person
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"China Market," and the readiness of international competitors to step in to
fill U.S. business' shoes gave Barshefsky's Chinese counterparts great confid-
ence that she could never build a coalition strong enough to make headway
on the issue. The Chinese felt all-too-confident that, even if the United States
and China did sign yet another IPR agreement, it would surely languish with
its predecessors, inert and unenforced. Even the 1989 horror of Tiananmen
Square had not resulted in sustained U.S. trade sanctions.
Barrier #2: Competing non-business U.S. interests. Multiple U.S. interests in
effect aligned with the Chinese in opposing sanctions-driven negotiation on
IPR, concerned that such action could adversely affect their issue-areas. The
U.S. national security community coveted China's potential leverage over
rogue states such as North Korea and viewed Chinese missile sales to Iran
and Pakistan as primary objects for U.S. diplomacy. Human rights groups did
not want to waste U.S. negotiating capital on "low-level commercial consid-
erations" in the face of China's treatment of dissidents, policies toward Tibet,
alleged exploitation of prison labor, forced abortions, and so forth. Environ-
mentalists were alarmed at Chinese overpopulation and staggering increases
in pollution that, if left unchecked, would fuel the engine of global warming.
In short, going to the mat with the Chinese over a "few pirated CDs" would
be opposed by powerful groups within the United States that advocated other
important agendas in the U.S.-Chinese relationship.
Barrier #3: A divided, often-opposed U.S. business community. As for the
business community, who stood on which side turned out to be a complex
matter. Core IPR industries like film and sound recording led the push. But
not all industry executives believed USTR should rock the boat. U.S. busi-
nesses with a stake in the China market countered forcefully. The last thing
businesses already deeply engaged in China or avidly pursuing the Chinese
market needed was soured relations from a fight over IPR. International
competitors stood all-too-ready to fill the void. The crude form of the argu-
ment went like this: "Does anybody really believe the Clinton administration
is prepared to shoot down Boeing's access to its most lucrative new growth
market for commercial aircraft, that it would let Toyota walk away with the
rich contracts sought by General Motors and Ford to build engines for China's
awakening automobile industry?" 8
Division even characterized the U.S. IPR community itself. Balancing
the steady-as-you-go sentiments of U.S. IPR-focused businesses that were
already entrenched in China with the very real needs of the intellectual prop-
erty industries harmed by rampant piracy and other IPR violations would
be no easy task. While record, film, and pharmaceuticals executives were
familiar Washington D.C. fixtures, many in key IPR industries, such as
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business software, had largely disdained political involvement in the United
States, preferring instead to concentrate on "real" business. Indeed some soft-
ware companies vaguely supported piracy inasmuch as it further established
their products as standards in the world market. It remained unclear whether
IPR issues could provide a strong enough rallying call to overcome business
interests intent on coping with, maintaining, and even manipulating the status
quo in China.
Barrier #4: White House reticence following the MFN-Chinese human rights
debacle. Even Barshefsky's own colleagues in the Clinton administration
disagreed on how to proceed on China IPR. For his part, President Clinton
would tread very cautiously after the humiliating failure of the last U.S.
attempt to toughen its position on China through trade sanctions. During the
1992 presidential campaign, candidate Clinton had excoriated George Bush
over America's "coddling" of the Chinese on human rights. Soon after his
election, Clinton signed an executive order to deny China's Most Favored
Nation (MFN) trade status absent Chinese progress on human rights. The
prospect of this action unleashed widespread opposition.
For example, China informed AT&T executives that, should Clinton
revoke MFN status or attach conditions, China would cancel the first phase -
a $100 million joint venture in Qingdao - of a multi-billion dollar project to
build the framework for China's telecommunications network. The message
to U.S. businesses was clear: tamper with China's MFN status and beware of
the consequences. As a result, AT&T became a prime signatory of a letter sent
to Clinton intending to influence his 1993 MFN decision. The letter, signed by
298 influential U.S. companies and trade associations, strongly urged Clinton
not revoke or attach conditions to MFN.9
Business opponents were hardly alone in the human rights-MFN episode:
Clinton's executive order evoked studied indifference in the international
community and outright defiance - not cooperation - from the Chinese, who,
among other measures, stepped up the arrest of dissidents. In a politically
humiliating about-face, a deeply embarrassed Clinton ultimately felt forced
to revoke the order.
When Barshefsky raised the political specter of yet another sanctions
threat against China, this time to protest IPR violations rather than the human
rights focus of the previous attempt, some in the Clinton administration such
as then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, argued that a get-tough sanctions
approach was the right road. Yet other aides felt badly burned by the MFN-
human rights debacle and were leery of reliving it. In its first few years,
the Clinton Administration had used sanctions threats in nearly every major
policy area vis-A-vis China. As one commentator explained, "the threat of
sanctions in all areas has simply overwhelmed the relationship."' 0 So, like
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many other pockets of the American community, the White House itself could
not offer the solid backing needed to bolster Barshefsky's credibility with
respect to any new threat of sanctions to obtain an IPR deal with China.
Barrier #5: Lack of active support from other trading partners. Like some
sectors of the American business community, many U.S. trading partners
tacitly supported a sanctions-based stand against IPR violations in China in
principle, but for the most part would refuse to overtly join forces in the battle,
fearful of the consequences to their national industries. According to Kenneth
Lieberthal, "[t]he fact that in almost every instance the other G-7 countries
have not supported America's threats has made Washington's claim that it is
acting on behalf of widely accepted international norms ring hollow."'" And,
obviously, actors like Hong Kong were caught in the middle and could not
support U.S. sanctions even if they were minded to do so.
Other potentially complicating factors. Of course, the list of existing barriers
could easily be expanded. For example, although she had scored notable deal-
making success in her 18-year private sector career at Steptoe & Johnson in
Washington, D.C., Barshefsky had never worked in government, nor was she
well-versed in operating in an environment as highly politicized as USTR
had become. As a political outsider, unlike many previous USTRs, she had
comparatively little direct familiarity and few personal relationships with
key members of Congress. Additional potential obstacles could be found
in several other realms: national cultural differences between the United
States and China, specific personalities, issues of gender and status, decision-
making complexities on all sides, legal and institutional blockages to action,
as well as the technical and economic complexities and linkages of the issues
themselves.
All these extra barriers, however, would operate through the main parties
involved directly or indirectly with the negotiation. Thus, one way to
represent the complexities detailed above is with a deal diagram (Figure 1)
roughly indicating which parties favored, were skeptical of, or could be
counted on to oppose Barshefsky's sanctions-driven IPR policy. This repre-
sentation highlights the paucity of obvious support and the daunting nature
of the challenge for an advocate intent on negotiating such a policy into
meaningful existence. Of course, one reasonable conclusion that might have
been reached from this exercise of characterizing the parties by their level
of support might have been to abandon the effort or seek merely to be
seen as acting for political cover purposes. Nevertheless, the organized steps
Barshefsky orchestrated to overcome these barriers suggests a more general
approach. 12
CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY AND IP RIGHTS IN CHINA 317
Executive Congress Domestic
Branch ... r. Interests




] D ef e n se ] H ig h -T e c h/Bot 
Key: Broader
Public
Figure 1. IPR deal with sanctions threat: Likely initial alignments.
Surmounting the Barriers: A Disaggregated, Sequential Approach
Arguably, success in this negotiation required winning a "three-front" war: a
domestic battle; conflicts with non-Chinese trading partners and allies; and
a struggle with Chinese counterparts. Barshefsky knew that she could not
count on White House support unless she had domestic interests - espe-
cially business - behind her or neutralized. Without both of these elements,
negotiations with the Chinese likely were doomed. And in Chinese-U.S.
negotiations, support from other allies, whether overt or tacit, would be very
helpful. Thus, while much activity (necessarily) proceeded simultaneously
on each of these fronts, Barshefsky adopted a distinct sequential emphasis:
(1) domestic interests; (2) the White House and Congress; (3) U.S. allies;
and (4) China, both Beijing and key provinces. As detailed below, a specially
designed approach, with major elements disaggregated and tailored to each
segment, and carefully sequenced, was used to build what could be described
as a de facto winning coalition in favor of an IPR agreement. t 3
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The Domestic Front
After she took actions detailed below, to unify the coalition that would natur-
ally support her position, Barshefsky understood that an important element
of her strategy would necessarily include framing the issues, carefully tail-
oring the frame for various audiences. The wider public and Congress needed
a simple, persuasive message grounded in terms of the broader national
interest. Domestic spoilers likely to block this initiative needed potent argu-
ments showing that these negotiations would benefit more than just industries
seen as favored by Democrats (film, music, software), but would actually
advance other groups' interests as well. Further, she needed to make the
case that a sanctions-backed push for IPR was neither reckless nor likely
to provoke a U.S.-Chinese crisis. Interestingly, while these arguments were
aimed in the first instance at neutralizing the opposition of key domestic
interests, they were also essential to gain credible White House backing for
powerful "external" diplomacy. Consider each of these efforts in turn.
Unifying a supportive coalition and making the general case. The Inter-
national Intellectual Property Association (IIPA) and its affiliates offered a
ready-made, fully supportive, and highly-informed coalition to tap. Intellec-
tual property industry associations had startlingly detailed facts and figures
at hand to describe the nature and extent of IPR abuses in China. Their
research provided specifics that would prove to be essential underpinnings
in the process, both to convince various interests within the United States to
act and to demonstrate to the Chinese that USTR meant business.
An important part of the process would certainly be to exploit the growing
public recognition by the early 1990s that America's comparative advantage
lay in its intellectual property industries. Vocal mainstays of the intellectual
property community included the politically influential motion picture and
sound recording industries. They were major American export powerhouses
in their own right and had significant Washington operations.
Unlike the entertainment companies, with the technological revolution of
the 1980s and 1990s, business software and other technology-based intel-
lectual property interests were increasingly troubled by their lack of IP
protection abroad. Yet they were at this time only beginning to expand their
presence in Washington. In fact, their issues were largely raised independ-
ently of the traditional record, film and pharmaceutical industry concerns.
Barshefsky and her colleagues increasingly linked the concerns of all indus-
tries, pointedly including all of these interests in meetings, ensuring that
numerous industries testified at the same hearings and discussed their testi-
mony and common concerns in advance, etc. She advanced this strategy
in part to ensure that these otherwise separate IPR proponents began to
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coordinate their actions. Barshefsky saw that helping to midwife this defacto
IP-industry coalition could make the intellectual property lobby a far more
formidable player in Washington.
Broadening the frame to gain business acquiescence. USTR actively pro-
moted the IPR problem as a broader concern extending beyond CDs, videos,
and lost sales in China. In a January 1995 press conference, Barshefsky's
superior, then-USTR Mickey Kantor, relayed the story of how a U.S. nego-
tiator visited a store in Beijing on a recent negotiating trip and bought what
was labeled as a bottle of Proctor & Gamble shampoo. Later he found the
bottle contained lye and a counterfeited Proctor & Gamble label. 14 A rash
of pharmaceutical counterfeiting heightened awareness in China and abroad
of the public safety (and negative marketing) implications of unchecked
IPR piracy in China. Bonnie Richardson of the Motion Picture Association
recalled another press conference when Kantor stood up waving a box of fake
Kellogg's Corn Flakes. She explained, "this was not just a copyright issue.
It was [an] issue that affected companies well beyond LA."'15 In the face
of accusations that the Executive Branch pampered Hollywood and Seattle
at the expense of other domestic interests, USTR emphasized that Chinese
IPR violations damaged a broad range of U.S. industries, adversely affected
products' reputations, threatened health and safety, and had the potential to
reach devastating proportions should violations go unheeded. 16 Furthermore,
these consequences were magnified given that much pirated material was
exported from China to other markets.
In her attempt to secure the backing of the divided business community,
Barshefsky adapted the broadening approach still further. She emphasized
that a company didn't have to be a movie or recording studio or Microsoft to
suffer from IPR abuses in China. As China liberalized its import and export
policies, protecting patents, trademarks, and copyrights had become increas-
ingly crucial to businesses everywhere. Barshefsky repeatedly emphasized
that improved protection of IPR in China would have a positive effect, in the
long run, for all businesses operating there. Enhanced IPR protection would
mean enhanced rule of law, something all U.S. businesses engaged in China
(and other interest groups) sought to foster.
Her carefully planned strategy to garner the support - or tacit acquies-
cence - of the American business community was also aided by a bit of luck.
In 1995, Barshefsky received a signal from the CEO of one of America's
most powerful and well respected businesses, one that not-coincidentally was
heavily entrenched in the China market. He signaled that his company was
willing to withstand Chinese retaliation against sanctions in the short term if
it meant attaining strong IPR protections in the long-run. He acknowledged
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that strong IPR protections were important enough to the sustainability of his
business in China and around the world to take what might be a large hit to
get there. Given this degree of foresight, it became more difficult for Amer-
ican businesses operating in China to refuse to follow suit. 17 Though U.S.
companies still shied away from outright confrontation with China, many of
them silently cheered USTR's tough stance. As Rich Brecher, formerly of
the U.S.-China Business Council, observed, "businesses deeply involved in
China's market were purposefully not supportive, but at the same time did
nothing to undercut USTR's efforts."'18
Broadening the frame to gain the acquiescence of non-business interest
groups. The business lobby might have been persuaded to bite its collective
lip, but other groups could be counted on to mount vocal attacks. Labor
interests were perhaps the only Washington lobby mainstay that could be
counted on to back action on the China IPR issue - it would jump at
any opportunity to reduce cheap Chinese imports. But a sanctions blowout
threatened Chinese cooperation on security issues, environmental initiatives,
and human rights promotion. Individuals representing these interests were
certain opponents of a sanctions threat and had little reason to keep their
concerns silent.
Barshefsky hoped that her broadening strategy might be persuasive in this
forum as well. She therefore focused attention on the expansive scope of the
problem by emphasizing that IPR violations related to broader U.S. concerns
over the rule of law and respect for individual rights in China. In meetings,
press conferences, and media appearances, Barshefsky and her colleagues
maintained that forcing China to live up to its commitments and follow the
letter of its own IPR law would enhance China's participation in the world
community to the benefit of a wide array of U.S. policy interests. If Wash-
ington could successfully stand up against Chinese IPR infractions backed
by a united domestic front, how many other U.S. initiatives might also fall in
line behind a rule of law agenda? Though certainly no cure-all for U.S.-China
tensions, cracking down on IP piracy held the potential to lead the way in
securing a wide range of American interests. According to Barshefsky, these
arguments were potent for her State Department colleagues representing non-
trade policy interests in China. If the United States failed to insist that China
follow its agreements with the United States and the letter of China's own
law (i.e., Chinese IPR laws were strong, however enforcement was weak),' 9
"how could the United States expect to move China in a direction compatible
with Western legal norms? '20 With Barshefsky's clever prodding, IPR came
to be seen as a test case for whether China could conform to its own law.
And for other groups, hoping to forge agreements with China in domains as
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diverse as security, human rights, and the environment, how could treaties be
worth anything if China didn't actually comply with and implement them?
Thus Barshefsky linked her IPR initiative with other groups' interests in far
wider topics.
Narrowing the frame. Alongside with efforts to broaden the frame within
which IPR would be viewed, Barshefsky sought, perhaps paradoxically, to
narrow it in key dimensions. Specifically, her narrative drew on a "logic
of similarity," matching tailored trade sanctions to trade violations. The
previous hard-line attempt against China, specifically the 1993-94 MFN
struggle, failed in part because the relationship between trade and human
rights seemed to lack more than an opportunistic rationale: why should the
United States impose trade sanctions for perceived Chinese human rights
abuses? Those interests hurt by MFN withdrawal could and endlessly did
cite this disconnect. Conversely, imposing trade sanctions on China for IPR
violations seemed a more "natural" recourse. Slapping China with sanctions
commensurate in value with the loss of U.S. property due to Chinese piracy
resonated. Barshefsky repeated a potent mantra: "we will sanction Chinese
trade with us in direct proportion to the extent that China is stealing from
our trade with them." Thus, framing both sanctions and the IPR agreement
as part of the same issue-area with an easily comprehensible and powerful
proportionality argument added to its appeal.
Beyond the appeal of a narrowed and tighter logical relationship between
trade issues and proportional trade sanctions lay a political argument vis- -
vis the Chinese. Whereas the MFN-human rights link had evoked the "high
politics" (for China) of security and sovereignty concerns, a case could be
made that trade issues could be dealt with, if desired, by China as a matter of
the "low politics" of commercial considerations. Hence, this narrowed frame
could be invoked to make the case with less risk than the MFN-rights link had
entailed.
What emerged, then, was a strategy of "acoustic separation:" selective
broadening and narrowing of the issue to fit Barshefsky's needs at different
points in the negotiation and with different audiences. At times, Barshefsky
made the issue appear very narrow - a trade sanction for a trade viola-
tion. In other fora, Barshefsky opportunistically chose to portray the issue
as far greater than a special interest gambit. Instead, the issue transcended
lost Chinese sales by a comparatively narrow segment of U.S. industry. The
problem covered a wider set of businesses, counterfeit exports from China,
considerations of product reputation and even safety, as well as a broader rule
of law concern. Barshefsky consequently made action on IPR a catch-all for
resolving pressing issues in virtually every facet of U.S.-China relations.
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Congress and the White House. Within White House walls, Barshefsky
expected, at a minimum, to find skepticism. Yet, as USTR's efforts to win over
business and other domestic interests bore fruit, it became politically safer for
the White House to support her sanctions-backed IPR initiative. Moreover,
Barshefsky saw that IPR violations represented an opportunity for President
Clinton to reassert his control over U.S.-China relations and to demonstrate
his willingness to defend American interests against Chinese transgressions.
As one trade analyst put it, "IPR gave Clinton a golden opportunity to be
tough in a way that made sense to a pretty wide audience." 21
Many White House advisors still counseled against the sanctions appro-
ach, both because of the risks of yet another bungled attempt and the very
real damage Chinese counter-sanctions could produce. But Barshefsky was
clear that the threat of sanctions would only follow a much more deliberate
process of exhausting other avenues and ceaselessly preaching the mutual
benefits of IPR enforcement. As these efforts failed to produce necessary
results, Barshefsky, along with Robert Rubin and others, began to believe
that aggressive sanctions action had the most potential to achieve U.S. objec-
tives. In the end, Barshefsky noted, "there reaches a point where it becomes
important to get tough, especially in this case where the Administration had
concerns over appearing 'soft' on China."22 Ultimately, she would argue, the
timing for a sanctions threat on IPR was right.
Fortuitously, the Congress was receptive to her arguments for tough
sanctions threats. Fueled by the rising bilateral trade deficit, the growing
importance of broad IPR business interests to the strength of the Amer-
ican economy, and congressional frustration over the stagnant MFN debates,
members of Congress craved an opportunity to take a stand against China's
unfair trade practices. Constituents, convinced that China acted unfairly when
it came to trade, were eager to see their representatives take decisive action.
Standing firm on IPR offered Congress an opportunity to do something.
Barshefsky also recognized that, given the negative impact of the 1993-94
MFN controversy, this IPR initiative could deteriorate into another crippling
domestic debate. To address this concern, she hammered away at the central
logic of punishing trade violations with trade sanctions. Unlike the threat of
withdrawing MFN, in effect severing the U.S.-Chinese economic relation-
ship, the logic of targeted, proportionate trade sanctions for trade violations
suggested a "winnable" battle. With the carefully garnered support, or at least
acquiescence, of powerful constituents within the business community and
other domestic interests, Barshefsky gradually convinced the Administration
and key members of Congress that this time would be different.
In seeking political backing for this course of action, Barshefsky and her
colleagues could also argue the standard strategic paradox: the more credible
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the threat of White House and Congressional support for sanctions, the less
likely the threat would need to be exercised and the more certain a diplo-
matic victory on IPR. She consequently earned significant political support in
tandem with her mobilization of the business community and other domestic
interests.
International Trade Partners
Preventing the international community from opposing and undercutting
threatened sanctions was also a necessary but difficult step in building a
strong coalition. Naturally, little support for sanctions could be expected
from those economies, especially in Southeast Asia, that stood to lose much
should sanctions and counter-sanctions be imposed. For example, when the
United States ultimately imposed its sanctions threat, prior to a February 1995
deadline and in anticipation of an all-out trade war, stocks in the Hong Kong
exchange plummeted. According to media reports at that time, $1.45 billion
of Hong Kong re-exports (exports from China routed through Hong King
traders) would be caught in the crossfire if a trade war were to escalate. 23
Here too, however, the sequential logic Barshefsky pursued carried weight:
with White House and Congressional support cemented, the likelihood of
sanctions - and major "collateral damage" to trading partners - could only
be mitigated if China made an IPR deal with the United States. Thus, trading
partners felt an incentive to focus their own persuasive efforts on China with
respect to this issue if only to lessen the chance of a trade war.
Barshefsky also realized she could sing the same "long term" songs she
had sung in other quarters to persuade Hong Kong that a tough stance was
the proper course. The Hong Kong government had piracy worries of its own.
Many of its re-exports were counterfeited goods - an activity Hong Kong
officials were anxious to see stopped in the interest of boosting confidence
in its market. Furthermore, the Hong Kong economy benefited tremendously
from investor confidence in the mainland Chinese market. Though strained
relations posed a risk for Hong Kong in the short term, Barshefsky empha-
sized that a more solid IPR environment on the mainland would be good
for Hong Kong businesses in the future. Due in part to USTR's persistence,
Hong Kong's eventual position thus mirrored that of the U.S.-China Business
Council and many other large-scale groups invested in mainland China: keep
the U.S. government informed of interests involved, but neither support nor
attack U.S. actions.
Barshefsky also argued to other major trading partners such as the Euro-
pean Union and Japan that IPR advances in China would benefit the global
trading system, whereas a U.S-Chinese trade war would carry collective costs
in excess of whatever gains U.S. trade competitors would reap. Although
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reluctant to support U.S. sanctions against China overtly, these international
actors provided an important source of indirect pressure, especially through
exploiting the keen Chinese interest in joining the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO, the successor to the GATT). As a senior Japanese official at the
time explained in a widely publicized press conference, "If China meets U.S.
demands that it develop mechanisms to control piracy, that would be 'condu-
cive' to the world trade system ... However, if China [does] not make a big
effort to settle the dispute, 'it would at the very least send a very disappointing
signal to the members of the WTO.' "24
The Chinese
While her direct negotiations with the Chinese were lengthy and spanned
two distinct stages, Barshefsky's approach had four core elements: (1) a
prolonged, "educational" process that framed an IPR regime as beneficial
to China long-term; (2) efforts to minimize the perceived intrusiveness and
sovereign challenge inherent in U.S. demands; (3) a series of actions aimed
at increasing the credibility of the sanctions threat in the event of impasse; and
(4) an aggressive information-gathering and diplomatic thrust beyond Beijing
into the provinces. Each of these thrusts functioned to shape Chinese percep-
tions of the value of a deal relative to the value of their no-deal alternatives.
Barshefsky's actions on the Chinese front represented the culmination of the
disaggregated, sequential negotiating strategy - starting with domestic U.S.
business interests - that she undertook to gain IPR agreement.
Framing an IPR regime as in China's deeper interest. While much public
commentary surrounding these negotiations focused on the sanctions threat,
which Barshefsky felt was essential as part of a strategy, she actively sought
to avoid actions that fed the perception that China had caved in to foreign
demands. She explained, "Commercial settings demand win-win agreements.
Both sides may compromise, but unless each side can leave the table with its
core demands met, no deal will happen, or, if it does, it won't be enforced. 25
In this light, Barshefsky believed that shoving threats down the throats of
Chinese counterparts would achieve little. Success would flow only from a
sincere, persuasive effort to show that Chinese and U.S. interests aligned on
IPR.
As such, her initial efforts, taking place over several months and multiple
trips to China, predominantly took the form of seminars and briefings offered
to a wide range of Chinese officials as opposed to late night, table-pounding
sessions. One of China's top priorities since the restoration of trade relations
in the late 1970s had been to acquire foreign technology and the know-
how to develop its own domestic industries and boost its economic strength.
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Barshefsky knew the narrative force of emphasizing to the Chinese that its
IPR enforcement difficulties gravely threatened these efforts. She therefore
emphasized that "China knew it needed to accelerate its development, and
that to do so it would need to jump over many of the stages of development
that characterize the history of other advanced economies. They understood
that strong IPR protection could be important in helping to leapfrog the
developmental hurdles that China faced.' 26 Barshefsky lined up a procession
of U.S. high-tech executives to underscore to Chinese listeners that current-
generation technology would never be transferred in scale absent real IPR
protection.
The force of this argument was compounded by another stroke of luck.
"It just so happened that one of my principal counterparts in China's State
Council," Barshefsky explained, "was himself a scientist, and understood
perfectly that the lack of intellectual property enforcement was dampening
indigenous scientific progress in China."27 Without real IPR protection,
Chinese industrial designs risked being counterfeited. The argument that IPR
protection was in China's self interest gained force in light of China's justi-
fiable pride in the world-class prowess of its scientists and awareness of its
increasing commercial footprint globally.
Barshefsky also took full advantage of China's keen interest in accession
to the WTO - both as a carrot and a stick. China had formally applied to
become a contracting party to the international trade body in 1986 (then
known as the GATT).28 But due to inconsistencies between China's foreign
trade system and WTO principles in addition to opposition from key WTO
members, China's bid to join thus far had been unsuccessful. China desired
the prestige, trade stability, and international acceptance that came with
WTO membership. In addition, membership could seal permanent MFN
status for China, ending years of frustrating annual uncertainty as the U.S.
Congress debated the Chinese MFN question. In coordination with compat-
ible messages from non-U.S. trading partners, Barshefsky ensured that WTO
accession became a major incentive for the Chinese to take IPR seriously.
Narrowing the nominal issue. While Barshefsky framed the issues in terms of
China's interests, she also minimized the supposed intrusiveness and signifi-
cance of her demands. Critically, China already had a well-developed IPR
regime on its books (largely as a function of earlier negotiations with the
U.S.). Hence, Barshefsky consistently argued, these negotiations were not
about forcing China to do something new against its sovereign will; instead,
both China and the United States nominally agreed on IPR principles and
their long-term value. As such, this negotiation was about the "subordinate"
concern of enforcement of an agreed-upon regime. And, in line with her
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efforts to align these demands with China's own welfare, "enforcing its own
laws" was arguably in China's self interest.
The issues were further narrowed by emphasizing the direct connection
between IPR concerns and economic measures. As Barshefsky contended,
"the Chinese can make the connection between policies that relate to commer-
cial matters. Here they saw the equation much more clearly than in prior U.S.
MFN actions related to human rights. Our message was so clear: Pirates are
stealing from us, so here's a proportionate response in the same commercial
domain. This they understood. 29 The idea was to circumscribe U.S. demands
as being within the realm of "low" (commercial) politics, without evoking the
"high" politics of major sovereign challenge.
Enhancing the credibility and salience of sanctions. In tandem with appeals
to Chinese interests, Barshefsky also worsened China's no-deal alternative
by the threat of U.S. trade sanctions in the event of impasse. This threat,
of course, critically depended on the support she had sequentially built up
within and outside the United States. She was determined to adhere to a
very focused, very precise list in articulating U.S. demands, including: a clear
picture of what actions USTR expected (e.g., reorganization and streamlining
of China's IPR enforcement mechanisms, greater prosecution of IPR crim-
inals, confiscation and destruction of illegal products, etc.); exact deadlines
for compliance; and the details of the review mechanism that would monitor
enforcement should agreement be reached.
In compiling a sanctions list, Barshefsky targeted items relatively easy
to source outside China, thus minimizing the effect on domestic Amer-
ican manufacturers dependent on cheap Chinese exports. Barshefsky further
focused the sanctions on Chinese exports from provinces proven the worst
IPR offenders. At the time, Barshefsky made sure that "the Chinese under-
stood that the United States would be tough on what it saw as unfair Chinese
trading practices. And the Chinese understood the political clout of American
IPR industries." 30
Barshefsky laid out a clear and attainable U.S. agenda for the Chinese.
Targeted demands with measurable markers of progress such as long-
term task forces and detailed enforcement schedules were consistent with
Barshefsky's negotiating strategy and objective of narrowing the focus. 31
Bringing negotiations to the provinces. Instead of following diplomatic pro-
tocol by negotiating exclusively with the central government in Beijing,
Barshefsky organized a coordinated communication effort with business and
local officials in provinces such as Guangdong, where piracy was concen-
trated. Barshefsky's team systematically gathered key provincial contacts
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whom they consistently visited on their negotiating trips. Talking with
officials and business leaders outside of Beijing not only provided more
opportunity for direct communication with those in areas containing the worst
IPR offenders, but created an opportunity for Barshefsky to make a much
more accurate assessment of potential sanctions targets.
Although Barshefsky and her colleagues met regularly with contacts in
Beijing, keeping officials in the main branches of the Chinese bureaucracy
updated on the progress of negotiations, Beijing was furious with USTR
for visiting provincial officials. These moves risked a damaging loss of face
for Beijing officials who feared their authority was being undermined. But
Barshefsky was prepared to take this risk in the hope that direct provincial
knowledge plus the ability to focus sanctions threats on politically influential
provincial players would translate into influence on Beijing.
Outcomes
The (First) Deal
By mid-1994, after months of intensive negotiating with the Chinese failed
to meet the full range of U.S. demands, USTR mounted its promised sanc-
tions threat on China totaling approximately $1 billion. Eight months of
tense process under escalating threats of sanctions, counter-sanctions, and
Chinese promises to cancel several high-profile U.S. contracts came to a close
following a marathon negotiation session on February 26, 1995, when a deal
was finally signed.
Barshefsky hailed the conclusion as a "win-win agreement, ' 32 calling it
the "single most comprehensive and detailed [intellectual property rights]
enforcement agreement the United States has ever concluded. 33 But while
Barshefsky was upbeat about the 22-page document, she was also real-
istic. "There is no question," she explained, "that the key to this agreement
will be implementation, and implementation means vigilance on the part
of the United States as well as political will on the part of the Chinese
government."34
Though indeed the final word on the agreement would depend on the level
of enforcement in the months and years that followed, Barshefsky had been
careful to address the enforcement issue in the document itself. Whereas prior
IPR deals had focused on improving the legal structure for IPR protection,
Barshefsky's deal was a document of enforcement. Among other elements, it
outlined a Chinese "action plan" complete with dates and specific enforce-
ment measures. During a six-month "special enforcement period" ending
August 31, 1995, the Chinese pledged to step-up enforcement of its IPR
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laws. Throughout this period, the United States and China agreed to consult
regularly to determine the levels "to which piracy had been reduced in key
areas of China."35 This gave USTR an important lever with which to evaluate
progress, a lever which would prove crucial in the year to come.
The (Second) Deal
Seven months following the February agreement, LIPA and USTR officials
on a trip to Beijing announced that Chinese enforcement measures had not
lived up to U.S. expectations. Early in May, 1996, after repeated consultations
with the Chinese had failed to produce desired - and, from her viewpoint,
previously agreed upon - actions, USTR again reinstated the 301 process,
designating China as a "Priority Foreign Country" for its IPR abuses. In
meetings with the Chinese, Barshefsky outlined several broad areas of failure
in compliance based on the parameters of the 1995 agreement. 36
Barshefsky and her team again focused pressure on provincial officials to
comply with enforcement measures, especially those in Guangdong. Working
with the help of the affected U.S. industries, Barshefsky honed U.S. demands
to include closure of specific illegal factories. Unlike the earlier agreement
that emphasized the adoption of enforcement measures such as confiscation,
destruction and prosecution, the new round identified specific factories that
USTR demanded be shut down. Thanks to the on-the-ground knowledge of
the IPR industry associations and extensive provincial action by USTR, the
list included the names of specific factories, their phone and fax numbers,
precise addresses, and the names of key individuals in each operation. 37
But because Barshefsky understood that local and even national leaders
might be indirectly profiting from the listed factories' activities, she knew she
needed to do more to secure action. She told the Guangdong officials, in no
uncertain terms, that, "if the factories are not closed, your textile industry will
bear the burden. Period. 38 Since textiles are a principal industry in Guang-
dong, both for employment and revenue, and because Barshefsky had built a
high level of credibility in delivering on her promises, Guangdong officials
became deeply concerned.
At first the Chinese responded by denying the existence of any pirating
factories at all. Later, after further pressure, the Chinese explained that inter-
nal pressure (e.g., rumored involvement of People's Liberation Army officials
in the operation of the factories) prevented them from taking action. Finally
the Chinese closed two factories. But that was not enough for Barshefsky.
In Beijing, as tensions mounted, Barshefsky received a surprise invitation
to meet with President Jiang Zemin. She recognized that such an audience
was rare and a particular honor for the Chinese to extend to a (mere) trade
minister. Still, much to the complete surprise of both the Chinese and Amer-
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ican sides, Barshefsky returned the following answer through her counterpart,
China's trade minister: "I would be honored and delighted to meet with Pres-
ident Jiang, but I am afraid that would be impossible." When asked what she
meant, Barshefsky responded, "I cannot meet with President Jiang and then
impose sanctions. If all 15 factories are not closed, I will have no choice but
to impose sanctions, and I do not want to put President Jiang, or you, in that
embarrassing position." 39
As Barshefsky reported these events back to the White House Situation
Room, as afait accompli, staffers sat stunned. But Barshefsky explained that
she turned Jiang down because she firmly believed that the Chinese could and
would do more. Later, then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher somewhat
uncharacteristically wrote a note to Barshefsky saying he would never forget
that night; the silence in the Situation Room was stunning. It was a gutsy
move, but, in his normally cautious view, she had been dead right.40
Ultimately, China did do more. Over the course of the next two years,
China closed 70 factories and exports of pirated products had been reduced
to virtually nil.41 In the years since the 1995-96 IPR struggles, enforcement
of IPR has continued to occupy the agendas of USTR and its Chinese coun-
terpart. In discussions of improvement in the months after the 1996 accord,
Barshefsky noted that China had begun to make "important progress" in
its anti-piracy campaign. Reaction from industry was likewise positive, if
hesitant. Echoing concerns from the business community that the United
States remain vigilant on IPR, Barshefsky acknowledged that the 1995 and
1996 Agreements had only "scratched the surface,, 42 Explained Barshefsky,
"We're by no means satisfied that piracy has been eradicated, '43 Despite the
positive press that followed the 1996 Accord and the pronouncements from
organizations such as the IIPA that piracy in China had been reduced substan-
tially, Barshefsky knew the IPR problem had been far from solved. It would
remain an ongoing issue.
Nevertheless, as a Deputy USTR, her work on China IPR and other
negotiating initiatives helped Barshefsky to become the 12th United States
Trade Representative in 1997 (after a one-year stint in an "Acting" capacity).
During her tenure, USTR negotiated more than 300 separate trade agree-
ments, including the historic bilateral agreement with China on the terms of
its accession to the World Trade Organization and Congressional passage of
permanent normal trade relations for China.44
Conclusions
Reviewing this extended negotiation, a number of conclusions and observa-
tions suggest broader application.
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An inherently multi-party, multi-level process. While shorthand references
abound to this and related episodes as "U.S.-Chinese" bilateral negotia-
tions, the central negotiating reality was one of multiple parties and levels.
More precisely, Barshefsky orchestrated a series of linked, bilateral negotia-
tions within a multiparty structure. Illustrating this point, Figure 1 offered
a summary schematic of the main involved parties and interests. From the
standpoints of analysis and prescription, conceptualizing this negotiation
mainly as bilateral dealings between two monolithic parties would lead one
astray.
A disaggregated, sequential, coalitional approach facilitated by "acoustically
separated" issue-frames. Complementing the "barriers" analysis at the start
of this article, the implication of the initial "deal diagram" in Figure 1 is
one of overwhelming opposition to a sanctions-backed IPR strategy. In stark
contrast, Figure 2 illustrates the transformation of the majority of the opposi-
tion to neutral or positive stances, arguably in large measure as a function of
Barshefsky's strategy.
As such, and consistent with the "linked bilateral-multiparty" structure,
a coalitional logic is central to account for the results. In the prior human
rights-MFN debacle, a potent, defacto blocking coalition had formed against
Clinton's initiative consisting of the Chinese government in Beijing and
U.S. business interests with activities in China. Barshefsky's actions can
be interpreted as pre-empting the formation of that coalition while sequen-
tially building a sanctions-supporting, or at least sanctions-neutral, "winning"
coalition with which ultimately to confront Beijing.45 While her actions often
overlapped and were, to some extent, necessarily pursued simultaneously, the
sequential emphasis of her approach was roughly as follows:
1) unify supportive domestic IPR industries;
2) neutralize U.S. industries with a major presence in China;
3) assuage concerns of broader U.S. interest groups;
4) persuade the White House and key Congressional members that course of
action including the ultimate threat of sanctions was politically attractive;
5) convince U.S. trading partners not to oppose the initiative and to privately
play the WTO card in their dealings with China;
6) seek allies within the Beijing government;
7) take the process to the provinces, especially Guangdong, and credibly
threaten core interests of influential players; and
8) deal intensively with Beijing under an implicit sanctions deadline.
While successful variations of this sequence can easily be imagined, its
essential order and broader animating logic - dealing early with domestic
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opponents and later with Beijing - were integral to Barshefsky's strategy of
managing great complexity and overcoming potent opposition.
Systematic efforts to frame the issue very differently for various parties
appear to have underpinned this sequential approach. Sometimes called
"acoustic separation" in legal contexts, controlling the "face of the issue" in
politics, or "framing" in cognitive psychology, Barshefsky and her colleagues
opportunistically stressed different, more palatable, attributes of the proposed
agreement to different audiences.46 Variously and in combinations, the
interests at stake were framed as
1) foregone U.S. sales in the Chinese domestic market,
2) pirated goods exported from China,
3) adverse reputational effects on brands and products,
4) health and safety implications of inferior counterfeit goods,
5) the potency of sanctions as a foreign policy instrument across many issue
domains,
6) a "mere" technical enforcement issue of pre-existing Chinese laws,
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7) an overarching "rule of law" issue with respect to future dealings between
non-Chinese and the People's Republic, and
8) an essential economic development instrument.
In practice, one can imagine considerable "leakage" among audiences as
well as a skepticism of self-serving, "cheap talk." Yet this case highlights
the apparent tactical importance of acoustic separation and suggests further
empirical investigation of whether and, if so, how and under what conditions,
this phenomenon operates in complex negotiations.
A "3-D" conception of complex negotiation: The relationship between tactics
"at the table" and strategy "away from the table." Largely left out of the
above account of Barshefsky's approach was what many general negotiation
observers regard as the essence of the process: interpersonal tactics "at the
table." Indeed, Barshefsky had a distinctive strategy, with both "educational"
- think of the IPR "seminars" in Beijing - and "hardball" aspects. "I've
heard jokes," commented one IPR expert praising Barshefsky's toughness
and tenacity during the IPR talks, "that beneath [her] cold exterior beats a
heart of stone."
47
Barshefsky as tactician "at the table." For example, Barshefsky believes
that negotiators should not be afraid to shake things up. After one lengthy,
repetitive series of talks, she once passed a note to a colleague, directing
him to leap up in frustration, slam his materials on the table and shout at
her: "Ambassador Barshefsky, I know I may well be fired for this, but I
cannot keep quiet any more. This process is going absolutely nowhere. We
should just walk out and declare these pointless talks over!" Shocked by this
apparently risky outburst, Barshefsky reports that their Chinese counterparts
gaped. "However, the cadence and tenor in the room changed, and for the
better. Soon, we were making good progress."4
8
Yet willingness to play hardball and employ tough tactics must, Bar-
shefsky emphasized, be coupled with flexibility and an ability to respond in
an unexpected manner. During one particularly arduous negotiating session,
the Chinese insisted they had gone as far as they could go on an important
IPR market access issue. In making this point, the Chinese negotiator became
very aggressive. Menacingly, he leaned far forward across the table towards
Barshefsky and said flatly, "it's take it or leave it." Barshefsky, taken aback by
his harsh tone, surprised her counterpart by sitting quietly. She waited 30-40
seconds - an eternity given the intensity of the negotiation, especially for an
American - and came back with a measured reply: "If the choice is take it
or leave it, of course I'll leave it. But I can't imagine that's what you meant.
I think what you meant is that you'd like me to think over your last offer
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and that we can continue tomorrow. I hope you understand that what you're
putting on the table is inadequate, but I am going to be thinking more carefully
tonight about what you suggested." The Chinese negotiator was shocked that
Barshefsky had not met his fire with fire of her own. Her unexpected response
gave her counterpart a face-saving escape hatch and changed the tone entirely.
When the two sides met the following morning, compromise ensued.49
And she stressed a familiar negotiating virtue: flexibility on the means
coupled with crystal clarity and iron firmness on the ends. "You have to
know what you want, and be able to articulate [it] in your own mind
with precision." 50 Barshefsky later explained, "[this] sounds self-evident, but
you'd be surprised how many people don't actually know what they want with
the kind of precision that a negotiation demands. Then, you have to think of
the 2,000 ways to get where you want to go: what the trades might be, what
the arguments might be, what the moves might be on the other side. And you
watch carefully, and listen carefully, talk less, and remain persistent.'
Beyond tactician: Barshefsky as "3-D negotiator" These tactical choices
are clearly consequential. Yet, as David Lax and James Sebenius have
elsewhere argued, a focus on process choices "at the table" can miss the
essence of effective negotiation in many settings, which consists of actions
"away from the table" to change the game advantageously.52 We argue for a
"3-D" conception in which interpersonal process is the first dimension, the
substance of potential agreements is the second, and the game itself (closed
or open; that is fixed or variable) constitutes the third dimension. Normally,
scientific analysis seeks to define a situation precisely and then reason about
those elements within a fixed frame. It would be difficult, a priori, to shoe-
horn the Barshefsky-IPR episode into a fixed setting. Instead, this narrative
illustrates systematic moves to include or exclude different parties in careful
sequences, to include, exclude, or frame issues and interests differently, to
consistently shape no-deal alternatives of the parties, thereby opening up a
zone of possible agreement, and considerable efforts to shape the process
itself.
If the five formidable "barriers" detailed at the start of this article - strong
opposition to a sanctions-backed IPR deal from influential business, non-
business, White House, trading partner, and Chinese quarters - are accurate,
it is difficult to imagine mere tactics overcoming them. Instead, actions to
change the game itself in order to create "space" for a desirable deal must
be given pride of place. As Barshefsky herself is quick to emphasize, "tactics
at the table are only the clean-up work. Many people mistake tactics for the
underlying substance and the relentless efforts away from the table that are
needed in order to set up the most promising possible situation once you
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actually face your counterpart. When you know what you need and you have
put a broader strategy in place, then negotiating tactics will flow."
53
The analysis of this article is, of necessity, limited to the perspective of the
protagonist and the largely U.S. sources consulted. Systematically incorpor-
ating other perspectives, especially Chinese ones, would undoubtedly change
the story, perhaps decisively. Yet the perspective of the focal negotiator, as
informed by whatever he or she can glean about the other side(s), is frequently
an inherent condition of the process. And "negotiation analysis" seeks a
prescriptive theory of action, in order to advise one or more sides as to their
most promising course of action conditional on the best available descrip-
tion of likely counterpart actions. Viewed in this light, Charlene Barshefsky's
actions suggest a number of promising approaches to managing the daunting
complexities of trade and other negotiations: recognizing the multiparty
aspects of apparently bilateral dealings captured in a "deal diagram" (like
Figures 1 and 2); a careful assessment of "barriers" to agreement, sequen-
cing to build a winning coalition and overcome potentially blocking ones;
"acoustic separation" of issue-frames; and, most broadly, the power of "3-
D" actions to change the game advantageously relative to a purely tactical
orientation.
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